Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) steering is a form of nonlocal correlation between two quantum systems where one of them remotely controls another solely via local measurements. This allows two parties to verify their entanglement even if one of them is untrusted, making it essential to quantum cryptography and communications. Here we study temporal steering (TS), which is a temporal counterpart to EPR steering, and discuss how it is related to the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols. We report the first experiment on TS by detecting the polarisation of photons sent in specific states through a noisy channel. We implemented two popular QKD protocols based on mutually-unbiased bases (MUB). We analysed TS by applying a TS inequality and a temporal counterpart of the EPR steerable weight. We connected TS, QKD, and quantum cloning to explain why and when the MUB-based protocols are secure. Steering can be interpreted as a correlation between two systems (measuring devices), where only one of them is trusted. For comparison, entanglement corresponds to correlations between all trusted systems, while Bell nonlocality, which can be formulated beyond quantum mechanics, refers formally to the correlations between all untrusted parties. Thus, steering provides the means for the certification of entangled measurements, especially when one of the parties is untrustworthy or measurements performed by the party are not fully characterized. This property shows an operational meaning of steering and indicates its potential applications in quantum cryptography and quantum communication, e.g., for entanglement distribution.
Steering can be interpreted as a correlation between two systems (measuring devices), where only one of them is trusted. For comparison, entanglement corresponds to correlations between all trusted systems, while Bell nonlocality, which can be formulated beyond quantum mechanics, refers formally to the correlations between all untrusted parties. Thus, steering provides the means for the certification of entangled measurements, especially when one of the parties is untrustworthy or measurements performed by the party are not fully characterized. This property shows an operational meaning of steering and indicates its potential applications in quantum cryptography and quantum communication, e.g., for entanglement distribution. 6, 17 Consider the following scenario: Alice and Bob share a number of pairs of supposedly quantum-correlated systems. Bob does not trust Alice and he wants to verify whether they share entangled states. Thus, Bob asks Alice to prepare remotely his subsystems in various states. To achieve that Alice performs measurements on her subsystems and announces the results to Bob. By analysing the conditional states prepared by Alice, Bob is able to certify if his states were entangled with their counterparts measured by Alice. Let us analyse what would happen if Alice and Bob indeed shared a maximally-entangled state, e.g., the singlet state |Ψ − = ( |01 − |10 )/ √ 2. Alice could steer the subsystem of Bob into two orthogonal states, say { |ψ , |ψ ⊥ }, by performing her measurement in the same basis. By informing Bob about the result of her measurement, Alice discloses the state in which Bob can find his subsystem. Alice can choose an arbitrary basis for her measurement, hence she can (conditionally) steer Bob's subsystem into an arbitrary state |ψ . This would be impossible if Alice and Bob shared only separable states, so steering can also be understood as the ability to prepare quantum states remotely by using quantum-entangled pairs of states as a resource. Thus, steering-based protocols can provide secure communications even when only one party trusts its devices. Such protocols are easier to implement than completely-device-independent protocols 18 but are more secure than standard protocols requiring mutual trust between the communicating parties.
Motivated by these seminal results, we expect similar important consequences from the temporal counterpart of EPR steering. Recently, it has been demonstrated by Chen et al. 19 that there exists a temporal counterpart
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of EPR steering when considering measurements on a single object at different times. The temporal steering (TS) is the ability of Alice to prepare a quantum object in a quantum state that after travelling, for a period of time through a damping channel, to Bob will manifest strong temporal correlations between its initial and final states. These correlations tell us how strong is the influence of Alice's choice of observable on Bob's results. The channel can erase partially or completely Alice's influence. This decoherence process will take some time. Thus, TS is an appropriate name for this effect. It was shown 19 that these temporal correlations are related to the one-way security bound in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol (BB84). 20 Therefore, this new kind of steering, similarly as the standard EPR steering, can be responsible for secure (one-way) quantum communications. However, Ref. 19 did not explain the origins of this relation between TS and QKD.
Using a quantum linear-optical experiment, here we describe the relation between TS and two QKD protocols: BB84 and the six-state 1998 protocol by Bruss (B98).
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These two QKD protocols constitute a class of so-called mutually unbiased bases (MUB) protocols for qubits.
We note that TS and its measures can have also other applications in, e.g., quantifying strong nonMarkovianity 22 and quantum information processing (including secure entanglement-based quantum communication) with a single multi-level system.
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EPR steering has been demonstrated in a number of experiments. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] In contrast to EPR steering, temporal steering has not yet been investigated experimentally. This article reports, to our knowledge, the first experimental demonstration of temporal steering.
Results
Theoretical framework. The inequalities detecting EPR steering and TS are formally equivalent. To set up the theoretical framework for TS, let us start with the assumption that Alice prepares her states from an unknown torrent of qubits by performing a Stern-Gerlach-type experiment. 29 Specifically, Alice separates qubits of opposite values of the analyzed spin observable. Let us assume that Alice and Bob use MUB (see, e.g., Ref. 30) and their observables are the Pauli matrices A 1 = B 1 = σ 1 , A 2 = B 2 = σ 2 , and A 3 = B 3 = σ 3 . The observables A and B have two eigenvalues a = ±1 and b = ±1, respectively. In our experiment we identify the observables A i = B i with the corresponding Pauli operators σ i . The standard Pauli operators can be expanded as σ 1 = |+ +| − |− −| , σ 2 = |L L| − |R R| , and ice chooses her observable A i = σ i by a proper rotation of her Stern-Gerlach-like setup. She performs her measurement at time t A = 0; then she at random sends selected eigenstates of the observable to Bob. The qubit that is sent to Bob is a conditional state that depends on Alice's choice of the observable, her outcome, and the initial state of the transmitted two-level system. The initial state is imposed by Alice's choice of measurement and her results. The final state is an outcome of the state evolution and the specific measurement setting used by Bob.
It is important to stress that in order to consider only nontrivial TS, we need a channel that provides a nonunitary evolution of the transmitted qubits (with the exception of the ground state). Subsequently, Bob measures the observable B j = σ j at time t B .
The TS inequality of Chen et al. 19 reads
for the TS parameter S N that depends on the number N = 2, 3 of unbiased measurements B performed by Bob. The left-hand-side of the inequality is a sum over the measurements of the expectation values
where the conditional probability
depends on a classical variable λ that specifies a given type of channel and q λ , which specifies the probability of the qubit being transmitted via the channel labelled by λ. Note that Alice and Bob do not know the value of λ. Bob's outcomes are related to the state projection performed by Alice, as 
1/2 , where the inequality is saturated in the case of isotropic noise. For each of these two QKD protocols there exist a minimal value of QBER N = q N for which the respective protocol is no longer secure. These values are q 2 = for B98 (N = 3). These values of the QBER correspond to the amount of noise introduced by the respective optimal cloning processes, designed to copy the states sent by Alice. The two cloning regimes are referred to as phase-covariant and universal cloning for N = 2 and N = 3, respectively. The relation between optimal quantum cloning and the security of these QKD protocols was studied in various works (see, e.g., Ref.31-35 and references therein). This connection to optimal quantum copying is anticipated since the security of the MUBbased QKD protocols is guaranteed by the impossibility of ideal copying of an unknown quantum state. 36, 37 The security condition can then be stated as
We can verify this security only if we know a specific value of QBER N . This makes the TS parameter S N useful in the case of symmetric noise, where
2 for which the relevant QKD protocols are insecure. The limiting values of the TS parameters are S 2 = 1 (at the TS-inequality threshold) and S 3 = 4/3 > 1 (above the TS-inequality threshold). We can also use a universal (although more experimentally demanding) a TS-based security threshold that works for any type noise. This condition then reads
where m is the smallest allowed transmission fidelity F i,a of a basis state |a, A i . The conditions (3) and (4) limit the possible values of QBER from below and above. They can be written together as
For m = 3/4, there are at most the same amounts of noise and signal in the basis states. While for m = 1/2, the fidelity can reach its smallest physically possible value, i.e., the value of F i,a < 1/2, which is equivalent to the value of 1−F i,a if Bob relabels his results accordingly b → −b. For m = 3/4 (m = 1/2), inequality (4) implies that the values of S 2 > (3 √ 2 − 1)/2 ≈ 1.12 (S 2 > √ 2) and S 3 > 3/2 (S 3 > 2) guarantee the security of the relevant QKD protocols under any circumstances. All of these values are above the TS threshold. Moreover, these values of S N imply the average transfer fidelity F N = 1 − QBER N > 1 − q 0 above the optimal cloning threshold. This means that the temporal correlations of such strength cannot be reproduced by probing a single photon sent by Alice in any physically possible way. From the above analysis it follows that the violation of the TS inequality is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for its security of the QKD protocols based on MUB. As found by Chen et al., 19 violating the S 2 inequality certifies the security of BB84 bounded by the fundamental physical limitation given by the no-cloning theorem. 36, 37 However, by implementing coherent attacks, Eve can induce less noise, which implies smaller value of q N than that for individual attacks. As long as the noise is symmetric, we can still use S N to check the security by applying Eq. (3). However, we cannot use it to quantify TS. Analogously to quantifying nonlocality, 38,39 defining a good measure of steering is not a simple task. EPR steering has been studied with specially-designed inequalities leading to all-versus-nothing measures. 40 Recently, Skrzypczyk et al. 41 proposed to quantify EPR steering with a steerable weight. This measure is described by a semidefinite program that can be efficiently implemented and provides an interesting tool for further study of steering. The approach described by the authors of Ref. 41 is "allowing one to explore a wide variety of quantum states and measurement scenarios". However, to our knowledge, a closed formula for the steerable weight has not been found yet, even for the simplest scenario. As we show in this paper, this measure can be applied to experimental data to detect the existence of the TS.
Experimental temporal steering. In our experiment, Alice with probability P (a|A i ) prepares qubits by rotating |H to one of the six eigenstates of the Pauli operators. This is done by the consecutive use of half-and quarter-wave plates as shown in Fig. 1 . To implement BB84, Alice sends eigenstates of only the σ 1 and σ 2 operators. She implements B98 by including also σ 3 . This method of state preparation is equivalent to performing a projective nondestructive measurement A i by separating states of a = +1 and a = −1 with a polarizing beam splitter (an equivalent of the Stern-Gerlach experiment), 29 and detecting their presence in one of its paths. A photon with probability P (+1|A i ) chooses the path designated for a = +1 and, with probability P (−1|A i ), the path for a = −1. However, the latter approach would be much more difficult to implement because it would require a nondemolition photon-presence detection (see, e.g., Ref.42). In the former approach, we assume that the state preparation is governed by the probability distribution P (a|A) is equivalent to Alice's nondestructive equiprobable measurements of A i for i = 1, 2, 3, where the outcomes of the measurement A i are a = ±1 and appear with the probability P (a|A i ) = 1/2.
TS requires the existence of at least two nontrivial channels labelled with λ. In our experiment, λ can have two values 0 and 1. For λ = 0, a photon of polarization V is erased, with probability p 0 = 1 − τ , with a filter of transmittance τ . With probability p 1 = 1 − p 0 , the photon is passed to Bob in the state R(θ) |a|A . The polarization is rotated by an angle θ, i.e., it is transformed by the operator R(θ) = 1 1 cos θ + iσ 2 sin θ. Each time a photon is erased by the filter, Bob counts one photon received in state R(θ) |H . We can set the values of p 0 and p 1 by setting the transmission rate τ , while we set the rotation angle θ by inserting two half-wave plates into the beam (see Fig. 1 ). We set in the experiment τ and θ in a way that Bob receives states which can be expressed aŝ
ρ 10 e − t B 2
where
The time t B , between Alice's and Bob's measurements, is measured in units of the inverse of damping constant γ. In our experiment, we set γ = 1/t, where t = 50 ns is the time needed for a photon to make one loop in the setup. The time t B = −t log τ is set by changing the value of τ . The states in Eq. (5) correspond (up to a unitary rotation) to the solution of a simple relaxation 43 model that provides an example of nonunitary dynamics.
Finally, Bob performs polarization analysis with a setup consisting of a set of a half-and quarter-wave plates and a single-photon counting module (SPCM). This allows him to project the incoming photons on every of the |b, B states. Bob receives photons arriving from both channels λ. As a result of Bob performing his projections on every of the six states |b, B j , we obtain the probability distribution P (a, b|A i , B j ) (we know what state has been sent by Alice) that holds the same information as the assemblage {ρ a|Ai } a,i . This is because P (a, b|A i , B j ) = tr( |b, B j b, B j | ρ a|Ai ). However, in the context of the QKD protocols we are interested only in the compatible bases (i = j), therefore, P (a, b|A i , B j ) = tr( |b, B j b, B j | ρ a|Ai )δ i,j , where δ i,j is the Kronecker delta.
Discussion. In Figs. 2 and 3 , we observe that our experimental data are in good agreement with the expected results. However, the correspondence is not perfect due to technological imperfections. From these measured results we calculated the TS parameters S N and the corresponding TS weights w t,N . The TS inequality [see Fig. 2 ] provides a sufficient condition for the existence of TS and a security threshold for the MUB protocols with symmetric noise. In our experiment this threshold for S N is usable only for BB84 (N = 2) at a specific time t B = nπ/2, where n = 0, 1, 2. In these cases, BB84 is secure against individual attacks if the TS inequality is violated, i.e., S 2 > 1. However, it is not so for B98, where the protocol can be insecure even if S 3 > 1. In B98, we deal with the asymmetric dynamics of the channel (i.e., relaxation process to one of the eigenstates of the Pauli operators), hence, we cannot assess the security using the S 3 > 4/3 condition. However, whenever the noise is asymmetric we can use the universal (stricter) security thresholds given by Eq. (4). These thresholds read S 2 > 1.12 and S 3 > 1.5 for BB84 and B98, respectively. The TS weight [ Fig. 3 ] proves or disproves the existence of TS. Comparing Figs. 2 and 3 , it is clear that the relation between the TS inequality and the TS weight is not trivial. The TS weight implicitly includes all possible TS inequalities, so it detects steering better than the TS inequality (1). In Fig. 3 , the value w t,N = 0 in the absence of the R(4t B ) rotation, or for t B γ ≈ 0, 0.4, 0.8 in our experiment, implies the insecurity of the relevant QKD. The opposite is not true. The increase in time of the TS weight for N = 2 is caused by the rotation R(4t B ) around the y direction that splits the TS weight between the z and x directions. Conclusion. We analyzed temporal steering, which is a time-like analog of EPR steering. The concept of TS is a useful idea that can be applied to the analysis of QKD protocols. As we showed in this paper, the TS can be easily observed experimentally, but its relation to MUB-based QKD protocols is more complex than originally suspected. 19 The inequality in Eq. (3) provides a lower bound on the QBER related to the TS parameter S N for cryptographic systems with arbitrary (isotropic or anisotropic) noise. In the special case of isotropic noise (which is the case for BB84), we found that the TS parameter S N is a simple function of the average transmission fidelity (or, equivalently, the QBER) and the number of MUB used in the protocol. We also found an upper bound on the QBER in terms of S N given by Eq. (4). This relation has also other physical implications beyond testing the security of the QKD protocols for m = 1/2. The value of F N = 3/4 corresponds to the classical limit of the fidelity of optimally copying the evolving state, i.e., splitting the original system into two equivalently steerable subsystems using such devices that process only classical information. Thus, if we set q N = 1 − F N = 1/4 in Eq. (4) and allow an arbitrary amount of noise (m = 1/2), then we obtain the quantum TS threshold at S N > N/2. This corresponds to the TS inequality threshold for N = 2, but not for N = 3, where
There exists a deep relation between the impossibility of performing perfect quantum cloning and the impossibility of sending information faster than light. This implies that there are values of S N above which it is impossible for Bob to obtain the outcomes reproducing the correlations before the photon is physically sent by Alice (reaching his setup) or it is successfully teleported (so the original one is destroyed). These values correspond to the quantum-classical cloning threshold, which implies S N > N/2 for arbitrary unbounded noise and S N > N/4 for symmetric noise. Reaching S N above these limiting values implies that Bob has no access to his future results before Alice's photon has been successfully delivered.
Methods.
Temporal steering inequalities and QBER. Here, we present our theoretical findings relating the temporal steering inequalities and the security of QKD protocols for the important case of isotropic noise. Let us rewrite the steering inequality for the specific case of QKD protocols, where we assume that B i = A i . This is granted by the construction of the QKD protocols, where any other choice of the observable B i is not allowed (and it is rejected). The probability P (a, b|A i,tA , B i,tB ) can be now interpreted as the fidelity F i (a, b) between the state measured by Alice and the state delivered to Bob if b = a. Alternatively, the probability equals 1 − F i (a, −b) for b = −a. Therefore, Eq. (2) can be rewritten as
Thus,
is the transmission fidelity of the eigenstate of A i associated with the eigenvalue a. Now, it follows from P (a, b|A i,tA , B i,tB ) = 1 2 , fixed by the construction of the protocols, that the steering inequality can be rewritten as
It is now apparent that the quantity S N can be interpreted as N times the arithmetic mean of (2F i,a − 1) 2 . This, quantity can be easily related to the average fidelity using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality that implies
where F N is the mean transmission fidelity. In the MUBbased protocols, the QBER is directly related to the mean fidelity, i.e., QBER N = 1 − F N . This finally leads to the following inequality
. A similar inequality can be obtained Using the expansion of S N in terms of F i,a , and the definition of QBER N , we can write
2 be the variance of F , where F N is its mean value. Then, we can express the variance as
There exists a strong inequality limiting the values of σ from above, i.e., the Barnett-Dragomir 44 (or BhatiaDavis 45 ) inequality for the variable F (which takes, with the same probability, one of the values of F i,a for i = 1, 2, 3 and a = ±1) that reads
where M is the largest and m the smallest allowed value of F i,a . By substituting σ 2 in Eq. (7) with the expression given in Eq. (6) we obtain
This is an upper bound on QBER N , which is saturated if F N = M or F N = m. It is physically justified to use M = 1 (no noise) and m = 1 2 (only noise) or m = 3 4 (the same amounts of signal and noise). A fundamental limit on transferring information with the particular basis is for m = 1 2 . If it is reached by one of the states, the number of usable MUB is reduced by one. However, for practical purposes, the case m = 3 4 is more interesting as it is related to the quantum limit on fidelity of optimal cloning. This means that this value is at the quantum threshold of the TS inequality. The value of m = 3 4
indicates that we do not use the QKD protocol if any of its basis states is transmitted with the probability of being randomly flipped to the orthogonal state larger than 1 2 . This refers to the case where a state is replaced, with probability 1 2 , by a completely mixed state.
Temporal steerable weight. To quantify temporal steering we introduce a direct counterpart of the EPR steering weight defined by Skrzypczyk et al. 41 The set of Alice's observables and her outcomes is given in the form of an assemblage {ρ a|Ai (t A )} a,i . The assemblage encodes the conditional probability of Alice obtaining the result a when measuring the observable A i , i.e., P (a|A i ) = tr[ρ a|Ai (t A )] and the states that are sent to Bobρ a|Ai (t A ) = ρ a|Ai,t A (t A )/P (a|A i,tA ). The states received by Bob at time t B are altered by a non-unitary channel. Thus, Bob performs his measurements on the assemblage {ρ a|Ai (t B )} a,i ≡ {ρ a|Ai } a,i . A valid assemblage must satisfy the following consistency relation
The above relations ensure that Bob receives a valid quantum state. The unsteerable assemblages, as defined in Ref. 41 , can be created independently of Alice's choice of observable (i.e., without entangling Alice's measurement outcome with the state received by Bob), and can be written in the following form
where γ is a (classical) random variable held by Alice, ρ γ are the states received by Bob, and D γ (a|A i ) are Alice's deterministic functions that map Alice's variable γ to a specific pair of the observable A i and outcome a.
Here we consider only the cases for N = 2, 3 and we list our choices of D γ (a|A i ) in Tables I and II . Assuming that N = 3, we can use Tab. II to find that, e.g.,
The abovedescribed model of unsteerable assemblage is also known as the local hidden state (LHS) model. The assemblage that can be described by this model is independent of Alice's choice of her observable A i , i.e., it is given by Table I , but for B98 (N = 3)
Eq. (9) . For other (steerable) assemblages there is no explanation for how the different conditional states Bob received could have been prepared by Alice without her performing the measurements of A i or sending the eigenstates of A i . This is why temporal steering is a necessary condition for implementing the QKD protocols using MUB.
Note that in order to calculate the TS weight w t,2 for BB84 (or w t,3 for B98), similarly as in the estimation of the QBER in BB84, Alice has to disclose which bases and Bob has to disclose his measurement results to Alice. To perform these calculations, she has to define the assemblage that needs to satisfy the consistency relation (8) . The valid assemblage is given by ρ a|Ai = 1 2ρ a|Ai (t B ). We can rewrite this assemblage as
This assemblage was used to evaluate the TS weight shown in Fig. 3 . The TS weight w t is defined as the minimal amount of strictly steerable resources that is needed to express an arbitrary assemblage in the following way
where ρ S a|Ai is a genuine steerable assemblage and ρ US a|Ai is unsteerable [as defined by Eq. (9)]. The minimum value of 0 ≤ w t ≤ 1 for which Eq. (10) 
The SPD can be solved efficiently for small matrices, which is the case in our experiment. For this purpose we used two SDP packages which provide consistent results. [46] [47] [48] By analogy with the TS inequality, we might expect that in the case of symmetric noise and a given number of MUB N , there exists a value of the TS weight above which the relevant MUB protocol is secure against individual attacks.
19,35 However, finding the limiting value of the TS weight for N = 3 is a difficult task because of the lack of a closed formula for the TS weight and the lack of an apparent direct relation between the TS weight and the TS inequality. Nevertheless, for N = 2 and uniform noise in the observables, we can show that the limiting value of the TS weight is 0. This is because the temporal steerability of an assemblage can be demonstrated by the violation of the TS inequality (1) or, equivalently, by reaching w t > 0. Thus, for N = 2 the violation of the TS inequality or reaching w t > 0 is a necessary and sufficient security condition for the relevant QKD protocol.
Experimental setup. Alice's setup, as shown in Fig. 1 , consists of Q A and H A that allow her to set any of the |a, A states. The polarization modes are flipped V ↔ H by H 1 , then separated by BD 1 and H-polarized photons are attenuated by the NDF. Next, the polarization modes are recombined by first flipping back the polarization modes V ↔ H by H 2 and then joining the beams at BD 2 . The channel performs the operation R(θ) with wave plates H 3 and H 4 . Each of these two plates implements the transformation that flips the polarization direction along their optical axes. It can be readily shown that the two transformations constitute a rotation by angle θ = 2δ, where δ denotes the angle between the optical axes of the two wave plates. The polarization controllers are used to stabilize the output polarization. To satisfy the consistency conditions (8) we assume that all the photons sent by Alice reach Bob, i.e., we interpret all the physical photon losses due to the imperfections of the photon counting process as the result of state preparation and not as the true transmission losses. However, the photons in the state R(4t B ) |V , which are lost due to the NDF of transmittance τ , are added to the final counts, i.e., the NDF is interpreted as a part of Bob's detection setup.
Bob's setup consists of Q B and H B followed by a PBS and SPCM (Perkin-Elmer). This setup allows to project the incoming photons onto every of the states |b, B . The beam splitter (BS) is used to verify if Alice has indeed prepared photons in the desired state |a, A before sending them through the channel. However, the purity of states sent by Alice is p ≈ 96%, i.e., Bob's results are effectively scaled by the shrinking factor s = √ 1 − 2p ≈ 96%. Moreover, the BS rotates the photons travelling to Bob by circa 7
• around the z axis with respect to the photons travelling to Alice. We take these factors into account in the presented theoretical curves, unless stated otherwise. The time delay, between the photons send via the delay loop and reflected to Bob, directly allows to analyse both the input and output states using the same detection setup. Single photons are generated using a heralded single-photon source. This source uses spontaneous parametric downconversion (SPDC) process occurring in a BBO crystal pumped by the third harmonics of a Nd-YAG laser with repetition rate of 2500 Hz. The signal photon generated in the SPDC process powers the experiment, while the idler is used for triggering. This triggering allows us to post-select only on valid detection events (by eliminating detector dark counts) and to gate signal detection corresponding to direct reflection on the beam splitter BS shown in Fig. 1 (no runs in the loop) from one, or possibly more runs, in the fibre loop. The experimental data collected by Bob are shown in Fig. 4 . The setup implements the intended transformations with the average fidelity of circa 95%. We used this value to estimate the sizes of the average error bars presented in Figs. 2, 3 
